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Abstract: Milano, 1827. The criminal proceeding against Count Giuseppe 
Brebbia, a Lombardo-Venetian’ senior official accused of misfeasance, is of 
considerable significance to investigate the interlinkage between social 
classes and administration assessment in the first years of Austrian 
restoration in Italy. At that time, undeniable signs of Adelstand’s difficulties 
in  handling public affair occurred, mainly at local level. The questions of 
how and why an impersonal administration rose can be answered only 
taking a closer look at this trial, around which many social and political 
interests clustered around. 
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In the summer of 1827, Austrian authorities became aware of some 
questionable conduct surrounding the management of the Fondo di 
Primitiva Istruzione, a government institution set up to pay primary school 
teachers in the department of Mella1. They promptly summoned Giuseppe 
Brebbia to provide answers, as the recently-appointed counselor of the 
Milanese government was also the former provincial delegate of Brescia2. 
____________________ 
1
 Counselor of government Luigi Crespi to Brebbia, July 14, 1827 (ASMi, Presidenza di 
Governo, fold. 102, n. 87/geheim). For some information about the Fondo – created by the 
Brescia provisional regency on September 30, 1797 (when «Brotherhoods and charities 
had been suppressed and all their properties had been confiscated, devolving their funds 
to communes and provinces to aid primary education», ibidem, n. 1266/geheim), later 
placed under the direction of departmental administration in accordance with the law of 
July 24, 1802, and still not yet abolished when the Austrians came back to Italy – see Piano 
provvisorio per la pubblica istruzione del Dipartimento del Mella (found in Archivio di Stato 
di Milano, hereinafter ASMi, Studi, parte moderna, fold. 396, file 1); report n. 16125 of 
Prefecture of Mella department to minister of interior, November 14,  1803 (ibidem, file. 
11), M. Agosti, La tradizione pedagogica bresciana nei secoli XIX e XX, in Storia di Brescia, 
vol. IV, Dalla Repubblica bresciana ai giorni nostri (1797-1963), Milano 1964, pp. 787-789 e 
821-822). With regard to Fondo’s workforce cfr. Almanacco Imperiale Reale per le 
provincie del Regno Lombardo-Veneto soggette al governo di Venezia per l’anno 1843, 
Milano 1844, p. 310. For a detailed bibliography on brotherhoods and other aid agencies, 
see M. Gazzini, Confraternite e società cittadine nel medioevo italiano, Bologna 2006, pp. 
22-57. 
2
 Eldest child of Francesco (1750-1818) and Camilla Arrigoni (1753-1843), heir of an old 
noble family, the House of Brebbia Counts of Barzago (see, amongst others, Alberi 
genealogici della case nobili di Milano, con uno scritto di C. Manaresi, introduzione di M.P. 
Zanoboni, blasonature di C. Maspoli, Milano 2008, pp. 236-237), Giuseppe (1777-May 24, 
1851) gradually rose through the public service ranks. In March of 1802 he became an 
apprentice in the Italian Republic ministry of justice, and two years later he was promoted 
to administrative assistant. Starting on September 16, 1808, he served in the same 
capacity in the Council of State’s legislative and ecclesiastical sections (see Raccolta delle 
leggi, decreti e circolari che si riferiscono alle attribuzioni del Ministero dell’Interno del 
Regno d’Italia, vol. I, Milano 1808, p. 11), where, on December 14, he was appointed as an 
additional member. After Lombardy was re-assigned to Austria, he embarked again on an 
administrative career, holding higher and more sensitive positions: member of the 
committee for the liquidation of the public debt from December 1814, on January 19, 
1816, he was made provincial delegate of Sondrio (cfr. Gazzetta di Milano, Milano 1822, n. 
22, January 22, 1816, p. 95). In 1817 he was placed in charge of the more prominent 
delegation of Brescia (where he took office the following year, on February 11). With the 
sovereign resolution of June 19, 1826, Emperor Francis finally declared Brebbia’s 
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This was not the first time that the high official had been ordered to 
account for issues regarding the institution, which he had administered up 
until the previous year3; yet this time, the withdrawals were far too 
substantial for the eagle eye of the empire to ignore. Despite the fact that 
the Fondo received an annuity of approximately 80,000 lire4, thirty years 
had passed since its establishment and it found itself having to deal with 
inexplicably meager resources5: £ 57,680.27 of «active loans» and £ 
25,123.83 of «income properties». In short, an initial estimate put the 
deficiency at a hefty 131,755.23 Austrian lire6. 
The expense items aroused suspicion as well, as the descriptions 
listed («classified police expenses»; «repayable subsidies»; «salary 
advances») had everything to do with the administration of the provincial 
delegation and nothing to do with running a scholastic institution. Thus, 
the authorities called for an immediate explanation, as well as the prompt 
repayment of all amounts taken out of the coffers7: Brebbia, however, did 
not do exactly as ordered, as a series of complications would result in his 
waiting until 5 October to deposit a modest partial payment of 18,000 lire 
in the institution’s funds8, and only after having reached an agreement 
with the Imperial-Royal tax authorities to do so. Though there may be 
____________________ 
appointment as an additional counselor of the Lombardy presidency government 
(«Consigliere soprannumerario presso questo Governo») (see protocol July 12, 1826, n. 
21864/4088, in ASMi), Uffici e Tribunali regi, parte moderna, fold. 479, file Brebbia Conte 
Gius., e Presidenza del Governo, fold. 105, n. 570/geheim, May 28, 1827, Stato personale 
di Servizio del Conte Giuseppe Brebbia). 
3
 Cfr., e.g., Luigi Crespi to Brebbia, June 11, 1827 (ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 102, n. 
87/geheim). 
4
 Brescia provincial delegate Gaudenzio De Pagave to President of Milanese government 
Giulio Strassoldo, February 18, 1829, ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 110, n. 
217/geheim. 
5
 De Pagave to Strassoldo, December 17, 1827, report drafted in despatch n. 791/geheim 
of July 18, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 102, n. 1266/geheim 
6
 Then rose to 142,384.39 lire, as a result of supplementary investigations (ASMi, 
Presidenza di Governo, fold. 102, nn. 788, 931, 1180, 1183 and 1184/geheim). 
7
 See Crespi to Brebbia, n. 327/geheim, August 27, 1827, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold. 102, n. 87/geheim. 
8
 Report n. 931/geheim, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 102. 
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interesting aspects to consider from a civil-law point of view, what really 
makes this matter so compelling is the criminal case that was looming on 
the horizon. 
The Austrian criminal code (Franziskana) – famous for investing the 
powers of both judge and examining magistrate in the same person – had 
provided for the introduction of a criminal procedure in Lombardy starting 
in 18169. The various steps could be described as a mix of repressive 
measures with the occasional glimmer of respect for civil liberties, and they 
were distinctly inquisitorial in nature: it would start with the «notice of 
crime» and proceed to verify the existence of «legal evidence» 
(«preliminary investigation», §§ 211-333 of the first part). From there, a 
search for «piena prova» (incontrovertible evidence, as provided for by 
either the «ordinary inquisition process» or «special inquisition», §§ 334-
414) would led to the sentencing phase (§§ 415-444)10. In addition, the 
Austrian regime also charged the judge with acting as the defense attorney 
of the accused, a peculiarity that arose from the fact that «defense was 
one of the official duties in criminal proceedings» (§ 337)11. 
____________________ 
9
 See sovereign resolution of October 22, 1815, in circular letter of October 26, 1815 
(Raccolta degli Atti del Governo e delle disposizioni generali emanate dalle diverse autorità 
in oggetti sia amministrativi che giudiziarj, Milano 1815-1839, from now on only Atti del 
Governo, 1815, vol. II, second part, n. 55, p. 361). In Venetian territory the 1803 penal 
code had been in force since July 1, 1815 (cfr. sovereign resolution of April 24, 1815, in 
Collezione delle leggi, istruzioni e disposizioni di massima pubblicate o diramate nelle 
provincie venete in oggetti di amministrazione politica, camerale e giudiciaria, Venezia 
1815, vol. II, first part, p. 139). 
10
 Codice Penale Universale Austriaco, coll’Appendice delle più recenti norme generali. 
Seconda versione ufficiale, Milano 1815 (hereinafter only Codice Penale). Similar, but 
simplified, the procedure for serious police trangressions: §§ 293-406, second part. On 
this, see E. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione. Processo penale, assolutismo e garantismo 
nel codice asburgico del 1803, in Saggi di storia del processo penale nell’età della 
codificazione, in Casi, fonti e studi per il diritto penale, S. Vinciguerra (ed.), serie III, vol. 19, 
Padova 2001, pp. 141-169, previously in Codice penale Universale austriaco (1803), Casi, 
fonti e studi per il diritto penale, ristampa anastatica con scritti di S. Ambrosio, A. Cadoppi, 
A. Cavanna, C. Carcereri de Prati, M.A. Cattaneo, M. da Passano, P. de Zan, E. Dezza, P. 
Pittaro, P. Rondini, S. Tschigg, S. Vinciguerra, S. Vinciguerra (ed.), serie II, vol. 18, Padova 
2001, pp. CLV-CLXXVIII. 
11
 Cfr. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione [note 10], p. CLXXIII, and Id., Il nemico della verità. 
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The Habsburg obsession with ‘formalizing’ all administrative affairs 
meant that the proceedings were meticulously transcribed. As such, we are 
able to consult a step-by-step record that takes us from beginning to end in 
an intricate and sensitive case12. In accordance with the tasks assigned to 
him by the Strafgesetz, a judge operating in the Italian Länder had to first 
open an investigation so as to establish valid grounds for bringing charges. 
Thus, the initial phase of this case saw the loyal magistrate sleuthing 
behind the scenes as thoroughly as he could, and almost two years after 
the first injunction, he finally had enough evidence to issue a decree that 
called for the opening of a «special inquisition». 
The charge brought against the counselor on 4 May 1829 would have 
set anyone’s pulse racing:  abuse of power, on the grounds of having 
maliciously taken advantage of his official capacity and breaching the 
duties thereof, thereby causing great detriment to the public 
administration13. To make matters worse, it was also held that he had 
breached his oath of allegiance in the form of aggravated theft, thus 
constituting grounds for a concurrent charge of  treason14. 
Brebbia was promptly suspended from all official duties without pay 
and placed under arrest: he had been deemed a ‘flight risk’, and there was 
also the fear that he could tamper with evidence15. For the Milanese 
____________________ 
Divieto di difesa tecnica e giudice factotum nella codificazione penale asburgica (1768-
1873), in M.N. Miletti (ed.), Riti, tecniche, interessi. Il processo penale fra Otto e 
Novecento: Atti del Convegno (Foggia, 5-6 maggio 2006), Milano 2006, pp. 32-47.  
12
 See, generally, N. Raponi, Il Regno Lombardo-Veneto (1815-1859/66), in Amministrazione 
della giustizia e poteri di polizia dagli stati preunitari alla caduta della destra: Atti del LII 
Congresso di storia del Risorgimento italiano (Pescara, 7-10 novembre 1984), Roma 1986, 
p. 99; L. Rossetto, Un protagonista nascosto: il ruolo del fascicolo nella giustizia criminale 
asburgica in territorio veneto, in G. Chiodi-C. Povolo (edd.), Amministrazione della giustizia 
penale e controllo sociale nel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, Sommacampagna 2007, pp. 61-91.  
13
 Codice Penale, first part, § 85. 
14
 Codice Penale, first part, § 161. For an account of the oath of loyalty which all 
Lombardy-Venetian employees took, see, at length, A. Arisi Rota, Pubblici impiegati e 
processi politici nel Lombardo-Veneto degli anni Trenta, in Storia Amministrazione 
Costituzione, 9 (2001), p. 118, and also F. Rossi, Il cattivo funzionario. Fra responsabilità 
penale, amministrativa e disciplinare nel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, Milano 2013, pp. 153-
155. 
15
 ASMi, Uffici e Tribunali regi, parte moderna, fold. 479, session of May 15, 1829. With 
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aristocrat, the next stop on this tumultuous journey would be prison16. This 
level of severity was nothing out of the ordinary for the Habsburg criminal 
procedure, as preliminary detention was considered a fundamental and 
instrumental part of exercising criminal jurisdiction: indeed, it was no 
coincidence that the code provided for «criminal arrest» and «preliminary 
examination of the accused» (§§ 281-306, first part) 17  immediately 
following the «investigation» (§§ 226-280), as it was an appropriate way to 
cap off this initial phase18. 
The second phase of the processura focused on gathering legal proof 
of guilt of the person placed under investigation, and  whose status was 
«aggravated by the existence of legal evidence of a crime»19. In this case, it 
became very difficult to substantiate the allegations against the Count. The 
only irrefutable fact available was that the accused had reached an 
agreement with the Imperial-Royal tax authorities in which he undertook to 
pay back the missing money to the Fondo20. This sort of unsolicited apology 
on his part – an excusatio non petita – might have been incriminating, but 
from a penal point of view it was irrelevant: according to the Franziskana, 
«when deciding on a case, only that which has been legally proven may be 
held as true» (§ 396). 
____________________ 
regard to the suspension from service (with or without pay) see circular n. 17043-2375 P, 
June 18, 1828, in Atti del Governo, 1828, vol. I, second part, n. 27, p. 76, and also Rossi, Il 
cattivo funzionario [note 14], pp. 278-279.  
16
 General police director of Lombardy Carlo Giusto Torresani to Strassoldo, n. 2538 PR, 
May 4, 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 117, n. 374/geheim, and also ASMi, Uffici 
e Tribunale regi, parte moderna, fold. 479, session of the government of May 15. 
17
 The police interrogation, technically speaking. In this regard, see L. Garlati, Il volto 
umano della giustizia. Omicidio e uccisione della giurisprudenza del Tribunale di Brescia 
(1831-1851), Milano 2008, pp. 70-72, note 194. 
18
 Cfr. G.A. Castelli, Manuale ragionato del codice penale, e delle gravi trasgressioni di 
polizia ossia Prontuario per agevolare ai pubblici funzionarj criminali e politici la notizia di 
tutte le disposizioni che hanno rapporto con ciascun paragrafo di detto Codice penale, e 
delle gravi trasgressioni, ed in ispecie quelle state pubblicate posteriormente alla sua 
attivazione ecc. ecc., 4 voll., Milano 1833-1834, vol. II, § 281, pp. 72-73 and Garlati, Il volto 
umano della giustizia [note 17], pp. 69-70. 
19
 Codice Penale, first part, § 281. 
20
 See supra, text and note 8. 
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In that regard, the magistrates had some initial hurdles to overcome, 
as they were faced with a lack of evidence: the Fondo’s cash books had 
been missing for some time. For Gaudenzio De Pagave, who was Brebbia’s 
successor to the Brescia delegation, this was somewhat embarrassing to 
admit21. Yet in the spirit of fair play, De Pagave sought to release the Count 
of all responsibility, as he felt any potential involvement on the part of 
Brebbia was unlikely and unsubstantiated22: to what advantage, he argued, 
seeing as how he had already declared himself the debtor for sums that he 
had even partly repaid? De Pagave was of the opinion that in order to track 
down the culprit, it was necessary to shift the focus elsewhere: namely, to 
someone who was afraid of being connected to the crime, and who would 
have had no difficulty in eliminating evidence of the misdeed; in short, 
someone who could have easily arranged for all responsibility to fall upon 
the then delegate23. 
Now, it would be a mistake to claim that Brebbia had absolutely 
nothing to do with the missing books. But then again, he would have never 
been able to withdraw all of that money without paying off the officials in 
charge of the institution’s financial administration: namely, the cashier, 
Giovanni Cantoni, and the accountant, Antonio Superti. The former was in 
charge of payments and balancing the fund’s budget24: his malfeasance 
could be inferred based on the amount of money he was paid by Brebbia 
himself, in what were only described as «advances»25. The latter was 
____________________ 
21
 «With reference to the disappearance of acts, records and documents, the Delegation can 
only refer to the reports of March 16 and April 19, 1828. […] Up to now, the search for cash 
books has not led to any results» (De Pagave to president of criminal court in Milan, Giovanni 
Gognetti, 12 May, 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 117, n. 429/geheim). 
22
 De Pagave to Strassoldo, n. 298 PR, May 26, 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, cart. 
110, n. 472/geheim. In response Count Brebbia will blame his successor for the loss of 
records (see Crespi to Strassoldo, n. 1369/geheim, February 23, 1831, in ASMi, Presidenza 
di Governo, fold. 148, n. 954/geheim). 
23
 De Pagave to Strassoldo, n. 429/geheim, May 17, 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold. 117.  
24
 De Pagave to Gognetti, May 12, 1829, n. 409/geheim, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold. 117. 
25
 De Pagave to Gognetti, n. 283 PR, May 20, 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 
117, n. 446/geheim. 
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responsible for approving accounts that had clearly been forged, and his 
wrongdoing could also be deduced from the disappearance of the books, a 
fact for which he was at least strictly liable: had they been kept properly, 
those records would not have vanished so soon after the investigation 
began26. Lucky for them, these hypotheses, which were certainly well-
founded, were nonetheless tenuous in terms of probative value, and as 
such insufficient to include as the «legal evidence» required by § 281 of the 
first part of the code. 
In the end, it would be the provincial delegation’s expense reports 
that revealed the fraudulent workings behind the Brebbia administration’s 
‘creative’ money management scheme: the listed descriptions showed 
substantial cash withdrawals had been made to compensate for the 
payment of classified police expenses, not to mention «salary advances»27. 
Put briefly: the Count was trying to make up for the Fondo’s losses by 
dipping into the delegation’s funds! 
The prosecution was pleased, as it had finally found the foothold it 
needed to knock down this house of lies once and for all. In fact, even if 
one admitted that the civil unrest of the early 1820s had indeed called for 
«costly surveillance», the 88,279.25 Austrian lire withdrawn between 1821 
and 1825 still came off as an exorbitant amount of money; all the more so 
if one considered that in the same time period, the Count had requested a 
hefty 49,302.19 lire from the general director of police, for the same 
reason no less28.  
And it was hard to turn a blind eye to the regrettable event that had 
occurred in September of 1825, when a certain Professor Horaczech was 
to be sent back to Moravia, and to do so the then delegate had 
withdrawn 1,705.29 lire not once, but twice: one withdrawal had been 
____________________ 
26
 De Pagave to Strassoldo, n. 298 PR, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold 110, nn. 446 and 
472/geheim. 
27
 De Pagave to Gognetti, May 12, 1829, n. 409/geheim, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold 117. 
28
 Gognetti to Strassoldo, n. 2908 PR, May 28, 1829. The certified abstract demonstrating 
the liquidation of his accounts, as provided by the then-delegate, shows that Brebbia’s 
excuses are full of holes: from June, 1821 to April, 1825 he had a «permanent fund» of  £ 
1,200 for secret expenses, which rose to £ 1,500 on June 14, 1822». 
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from the scholastic fund, while the other from a fund for the secret police. 
Brebbia, however, had not repaid the amount relative to the unjustified 
withdrawal, and to make up for the deficiency, there had been no other 
choice but to dock the sum from the professor’s pension29. 
Yet what counted more than anything else were the statements made 
during interrogation, a phase that was known as «ordinary examination»30. 
Standing before the ‘three-headed dog’ that was the Lombardo-Venetian 
criminal judge, Brebbia did not attempt to evade questioning: rather, he 
sought to fend off attack by adopting a clumsy and awkward defense. After 
admitting to his mistakes, the ex-delegate assured the judge that he had 
not misappropriated the Fondo’s resources «with iniquitous intent», but 
rather to deal with his own «domestic needs», and that he had done so 
with the intention of paying the money back; at a certain point, however, 
his accumulation of debt had become so uncontrollable that it became 
impossible for him to make good on the repayment31. 
Luce meridiana clarioris: in light of the confession, the actual facts of 
the case could now be held as legally true, thus eliminating the need for 
due process and further investigation32. In an inflexible criminal procedure 
that revolved around legal evidence, an admission of guilt was tantamount 
____________________ 
29
 Gognetti to Strassoldo, May 28 (ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold 117, n. 483/geheim). 
30
 Codice Penale, first part, §§ 348-373. That is, the «structured examination of the 
accused» (S. Jenull, Commentario sul Codice e sulla processura criminale della Monarchia 
Austriaca ossia il diritto criminale austriaco esposto secondo i suoi principj ed il suo spirito 
da Sebastiano Jenull, Dottore in legge, Professore ordinario delle scienze politiche, e del 
diritto criminale privato austriaco. Prima versione italiana dal tedesco. Con l’aggiunta delle 
leggi  e disposizioni colle quali venne posto in attività il Codice predetto nel Regno 
Lombardo-Veneto, 4 voll., Milano 1816, vol. III, § 348, p. 322). For a discussion in detail 
about the meaning of the word, and especially about the difference between costituto 
sommario and ordinario, see Garlati, Il volto umano della giustizia [note 17], pp. 70-72, 
note 194; with regard to interrogation see also A.A. Cassi, Negare l’evidenza e avere salva 
la vita. Codice penale e tribunali speciali nei processi contro la Carboneria bresciana, in 
L’ABGB e la codificazione asburgica in Italia e in Europa: Atti del Convegno Internazionale, 
Pavia, 11-12 settembre 2002, Padova 2006, pp. 317-337, p. 327. 
31
 ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 
1829, spokesman counselor Raicich, p. 2966. 
32
 On this aspect, see Dezza, Il nemico della verità [note 11], pp. 60-61. 
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to a relevatio ab onere probandi, meaning that the Austrian judge was now 
relieved of the burden of proof. Just three months after the trial had 
begun33, the judge was now in the position to make a ruling in the case. 
Thus, on 25 August 1829, Giuseppe Brebbia was found guilty of abuse 
of power. He was sentenced to two years of carcere duro (harsh 
imprisonment), stripped of his nobility, and ordered to pay all court costs; 
this, of course, in addition to compensating the Fondo for the damages 
incurred34. 
While the sentence might not have been lenient, it was not as harsh 
as it could have been: at the time, the standard sentence for that crime 
was harsh imprisonment for one to five years, which could potentially be 
extended to ten years based on a «higher degree of malice, and the 
significance of damage»35. The complete text of the ruling delivered by the 
court of first instance is missing, but it seems reasonable to attribute this 
act of measured clemency to a combination of «mitigating circumstances 
relative to the offender» (§ 39): namely, his irreproachable behavior before 
the crime (letter b), his willingness to compensate for the damage caused 
(letter g), and above all, his confession (letter h)36. 
There is also another factor to consider. It is a well-known fact that 
the Austrian system provided for a series of checks in the most serious of 
crimes37, in order to ensure greater certainty in sentencing and at the same 
time compensate for the lack of a defense attorney during trial: as such, all 
court documents relating to the case were sent to the court of appeal (§ 
____________________ 
33
 Cfr. Mazzetti to Hartig, n. 14254, December 28, 1830, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold. 136, n. 1285/geheim. 
34
 In the court of appeal’s sentence we can find the ruling (conchiuso) of the first instance 
(see Sentenza del 25 agosto 1829, n.° 1908, dell’I.R. Tribunale Criminale in Milano, in ASMi, 
Presidenza di Governo, fold. 136, n. 1825/geheim, and also in ASMi, Senato lombardo 
veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 1829, p. 2962). 
35
 Codice Penale, first part, § 87. 
36
 See G. Chiodi, Il fascino discreto del libero convincimento. Per un identikit del giudice 
penale lombardo-veneto, in Amministrazione della giustizia penale [note 12], 
Sommacampagna 2007, p. 23. 
37
 For a detailed account see Garlati, Il volto umano della giustizia [note 17], pp. 29-30, and 
for a general discussion, Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione [note 10], p. CLXXII. 
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433), and from there to the supreme court, known as the Lombardo-
Venetian Senate of the Supreme Court of Justice (§ 442). 
The court of appeal’s task was to ensure the proper application of 
criminal law: in this case, the ruling at first instance was upheld, though the 
sentence was reduced «for the purpose of mitigation» to two years of 
ordinary imprisonment38.  
The counselors of the Senate continued the trend of progressively 
reducing Brebbia’s original sentence by putting forward an even more lenient 
proposal. While all of the senators «unanimously» confirmed the defendant’s 
guilt, only five magistrates suggested commuting the sentence to one year’s 
imprisonment, and in the end the entire assembly proposed that His Majesty 
«reduce the sentence, for the purpose of a pardon, to the time served under 
arrest up until that moment»39. Even though the emperor would not 
ultimately accept this request40, it was clear that the judges did not have it in 
them to come down mercilessly on the Count. 
There were a few factors that had worked in the Count’s favor. First 
of all, not only had Brebbia been held in high regard for his loyalty to the 
regime, but also for his commitment and dedication to the administration 
of a turbulent province during some difficult years. This loyalty and 
selflessness – the highest values that the Austrians asked of their officials – 
had allowed the Milanese nobleman to garner the esteem and respect of 
the empire’s upper echelons. Those same high officials, however, would 
eventually be put in the difficult and somewhat embarrassing position of 
removing Brebbia from public office. 
Though he did not know Brebbia personally, Governor Franz Hartig 
felt there was a special set of mitigating circumstances working in the 
Count’s favor41.  And so too did the general director of police, Carlo 
____________________ 
38
 Cfr. Sentenza n.° 9133, Milano, dall’I.R. Tribunale d’Appello generale il 8 ottobre 1829, in 
ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 136, n. 1825/geheim, and also ASMi, Senato lombardo 
veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 1829, p. 2962. 
39
 ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 
1829, pp. 2970-2972. 
40
 Sovereign resolution of February 6, 1830, in ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di 
consiglio, fold. 133, protocol February 25, 1830, p. 485. 
41
 President of the government of Lombardy Franz Hartig to SMIRA (= Sua Maestà Imperiale 
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Torresani, who wrote a most heartfelt report to the Governor to inform 
him of the situation. Normally parsimonious with praise, he described a 
Beamte who had had a «long and brilliant career», who had been 
«appreciated for his noble and courteous ways», who – it was true – had 
«erred by making use of some funds under his tutelage meant for the 
public administration», but that «he did so without committing an immoral 
act». And Torresani lauded Brebbia for the economic sacrifice he had made 
in agreeing to repay such a considerable amount of debt, which in his view 
was only further testament to the Count’s good intentions; moreover, he 
would repay the sum «with the appropriate interest on the amount 
owed»42. 
Similar considerations had indeed led the magistrates to conclude 
that the delegate’s conduct had not been the result of a «well-thought-out 
deliberation», but rather an improper decision made without reflecting 
upon his duties, and even less upon the potential consequences of his 
actions43. 
Yet one fact remained: the case against the Count had been brought 
to three trials, and though the sentence had been gradually reduced, the 
verdict had stayed the same. In short, the judicial system believed that the 
elements of the crime as described in § 85 of the criminal code did in fact 
exist. After all, the provincial delegate was tasked with overseeing and 
safeguarding the empire’s resources, and those of the Fondo, «due to its 
very nature and purpose, and to the duties of the Authority in charge of it», 
were to be considered «a sacred object, not to be touched for any other 
____________________ 
Reale Apostolica, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty), n. 1363/geheim, April 26, 
1832, ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 176.  
42
 Torresani to Hartig, n. 4141 PS, June 28, 1832, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 176, 
n. 641/geheim. On Carlo Giusto Torresani de Lanzfeld (1779-1852), cfr. Biographischer 
Lexicon des Kaiserthum Oesterreichs, vol. XLVII, Wien 1833, p. 161; P. Pedrotti, Contributo 
alla biografia di Carlo Giusto Torresani, in Lombardia nel Risorgimento italiano, 16 (1929), 
pp. 3-55; M. Bellabarba, Il «fondamento dei miei regni». Giudici, cultura politica e 
letteratura nell’Impero austriaco di primo Ottocento, in M. Bellabarba, B. Mazhol, R. 
Stauber, M. Verga (ed.), Gli imperi dopo l’Impero nell’Europa del XIX secolo, Bologna 2008, 
p. 286. 
43
 ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 
1829, p. 2967. 
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purpose»; as such, it was clear that any misappropriation of the 
institution’s money could only have resulted in charges against him for 
abuse of power44. 
There was no doubt about the defendant’s «culpability» according to 
Vincenzo Raicich, the reporting judge for the supreme court trial. In his 
opinion, not only was the commission of the crime clearly evidenced by the 
amount of embezzled money, but also by the way in which the offender 
carried out the withdrawals. Indeed, if «it was already abuse to use the 
money of a charitable Institution for purposes other than those for which 
the money was meant», then «such an arbitrary act is all the graver, when 
that purpose is for private use»45. 
Placing all the facts in a legal context, the magistrates took a number 
of erroneous assertions off the table. First of all, contrary to what was 
initially alleged, they excluded the possibility of concurrent offenses having 
been committed: namely, the Count’s conduct could not be considered 
grounds for a charge of treason, as such a charge implied a direct 
connection to «the property of others as entrusted […] by virtue of public 
office»46, and Giuseppe Brebbia could not have managed the Fondo’s 
money without going through Cantoni and Superti. Even the special 
inquisition had acknowledged that there were doubts surrounding this 
issue47: Brebbia had not had direct access to the misappropriated funds, 
and therefore the intervensio possessionis (change of possession), which 
was a fundamental element of the crime, could not be legally proven.  
Secondly, the fact that Brebbia had attempted to repay the 
embezzled money did not even partially absolve him of criminal liability. 
Indeed, this had no bearing on the charge of abuse of power, because § 85 
clearly stipulated that «the law only provides for the potential damage 
____________________ 
44
 Counselor Vincenzo Raicich (ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 
132, protocol November 17, 1829, p. 2963). 
45
 ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 17, 
1829, p. 2963. 
46
 See Codice penale, first part, § 167. «The crime of treason cannot be committed by 
anyone other than he to whom the thing has effectively been entrusted». 
47
 Crespi to Hartig, n. 1369/geheim, February 23, 1831, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, 
fold. 148, n. 954/geheim. 
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[caused], and any indemnification that should perchance be provided 
after the fact does not invalidate the criminal nature of the action»48. 
Likewise, even a charge of theft would not have been affected by 
Brebbia’s attempt at reparations. The law provided for ‘exoneration’ if 
the stolen property was returned in full, in a timely fashion and before 
the public authorities became aware of the crime49, but Brebbia’s case 
clearly did not meet those conditions, as he had only partially repaid the 
amount he owed, and had been late in doing so50. 
Moreover, the magistrates did not lend any credence to Brebbia’s 
spurious and fanciful theory that as the supposed administrator of the 
Fondo – having identified himself as such in report n. 9938, dated 6 June 
1819 – he had had the power to use its money at will51. In their eyes, this 
was nothing but a laughable attempt at «vain refuge», and was not 
worthy of the slightest consideration: even if the management of the 
institution did not fall within the duties of provincial delegate, there 
were specific rules in place – set forth in both the civil code and in 
several circular letters – that forbade «any guardian» from claiming the 
right to use money to his own benefit52. What’s more, any respectable 
public official could certainly not «in such a strange and bizarre manner 
____________________ 
48
 ASMi, Senato lombardo veneto, Protocolli di consiglio, fold. 132, protocol November 
17, 1829, p. 2965. See also Hartig to Ranieri, n. 1361/geheim, April 26, 1831, and Crespi 
to Hartig, February 23, 1831 («the crime of abuse of power […] cannot be invalidated 
by the provision of indemnification»), ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 148, n. 
954/geheim.   
49
 «any theft or robbery shall cease to be a crime when the offender has compensated for 
all of the damage caused by his action before the authorities have been informed of his 
guilt» (Codice penale, first part, § 167). 
50
 President of court of appeals in Milan Carlo Della Porta to Hartig, n. 58 PS, April 21, 1831 
(ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 148, n. 954/geheim).  
51
 The report shows that he «replaced his precedessor» in the administration of the Fondo 
(Crespi to  Hartig, n. 1369/geheim, February 23, 1831, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 
148, n 954/geheim). 
52
 Cfr. Codice Civile Generale Austriaco. Edizione seconda e sola ufficiale, Milano 1815, first 
part, §§ 234-236; circulars dated June 9, August 13 and 21, 1828, in Atti del Governo, 
1818, vol. I, second part, n. 101, pp. 353-354, vol. II, second part, n. 134, pp. 457-458, and 
n. 143, pp. 468-475. 
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authorize operations that he himself had put into action in his own 
interest or for secret, illegitimate purposes»53. 
The duty of «administration or oversight» meant that Brebbia would 
never have had the authority to make such arbitrary decisions, and each of 
the three courts had taken this into account when issuing their sentences54. 
With the punishment of a rogue official, human dignity and 
institutional dignity converge. Thus, the House of Austria had no intention 
whatsoever of absolving Brebbia by citing his innocence of the crime, or 
even a lack of evidence55: on the contrary, the official was held to his 
undeniable responsibilities. They used no uncertain terms in denouncing 
him for having stained «the integrity and purity that each Royal Clerk, 
especially high-ranking Officials, must exemplify», and they stripped him of 
his prestigious public office, as the high ranks had definitively lost all 
confidence in him due to his conduct56. 
None other than the governor of Lombardy himself reaffirmed the 
upper echelon’s stance on the matter: even if one were to ignore the 
conviction delivered by the supreme court, which by law would have 
resulted in Brebbia’s removal from office57, «the arbitrary and illegal 
withdrawals made by Count Brebbia in his capacity as Delegate, from a 
public fund under his charge and tutelage, and put to his private use, 
would be such an [egregious] offense, that it alone could have resulted in 
that grave disciplinary action»58. 
____________________ 
53
 Crespi to Hartig, n. 1369/geheim, February 23, 1831, ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 148. 
54
 Della Porta to Hartig, n. 58 PS, April 21, 1831, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 148, 
n. 954/geheim. 
55
 Codice Penale, first part, §§ 427 e 428. 
56
 Crespi to Hartig, n. 1369/geheim, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 148, n. 
954/geheim). 
57
 V. Guazzo, Il funzionario pubblico ossia Manuale pratico-disciplinare pegl’impiegati regii, 
pegli addetti ai Corpi tutelati e pei disciplinati dallo stato, in cui sono e saranno raccolte tutte 
le prescrizioni delle leggi civili, giudiziarie, amministrative (politico-camerali), ecclesiastiche, 
militari e penali di ogni genere che si riferiscono al personale di tutti i pubblici funzionarii, 
Venezia 1846, tit. XII, cap. IV, §§ 113 e 125, pp. 207 e 209, especially § 99, p. 206. In particular, 
see F. Rossi, Il cattivo funzionario [note 14], pp. 105-106, 216, 238-239. 
58
 Hartig to Ranieri, n. 1363/geheim, April 26, 1831, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 
148, n. 954/geheim. 
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Indeed, the Count had been granted somewhat special treatment up 
until that point: the court of appeal had even moved to sentence him to 
ordinary imprisonment after his initial sentence of the much harsher 
carcere duro59. But once the conviction was delivered in Milan, there was a 
marked turnaround and the government counselor was a dead weight to 
be unloaded as soon as possible. 
What was unfolding bordered on damnatio memoriae. But upon 
further reflection, perhaps such a reversal was not to be unexpected: after 
all, in the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, a public official was looked to as a 
repository of public virtue; he was a living, idealized model that the 
sovereigns hoped could inspire profound feelings of loyalty and respect for 
the res publica on the part of the kingdom’s subjects60. 
It was no coincidence that after the «opening of the special 
inquisition», the ‘imperial eagle’ had swooped in to conceal the Count’s 
inopportune arrest from its subjects, in anticipation of how the matter 
would unfold: in a world of appearances, nothing was to disturb the regular 
course of events. None other than the general director of police himself 
had dealt with the issue, and he had been quick to report the success of his 
operation to the governor, stating that everything had gone swimmingly, 
«without anybody noticing a thing»61. 
And yet, while Brebbia was left to his fate – as he appealed to the 
sovereign for «any means to free himself and his innocent victims from the 
distress caused by his first and only transgression»62 – the sad ending to 
Giuseppe’s career was also the consequence of an inveterate vice that ran 
in the family. 
____________________ 
59
 Codice Penale, first part, §§ 12 e 13. 
60
 Cfr. C. Mozzarelli, Il modello del pubblico funzionario nella Lombardia austriaca, in 
L’educazione giuridica, vol. IV, Il pubblico funzionario: modelli storici e comparativi, part. II, 
L’età moderna, Perugia 1981, pp. 439-459; Rossi, Il cattivo funzionario [note 14], pp. 55-
86. 
61
 Torresani to Strassoldo, n. 2538 PR, 4 maggio 1829, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 
117, n. 374/geheim, and also ASMi, Uffici e Tribunale regi, parte moderna, cart. 479, 
government session of May 15. 
62
 Hartig to SMIRA, n. 1363/geheim, April 26, 1832, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 
176, n. 641/geheim. 
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Indeed, the Brebbia family’s financial situation had been anything but 
stable since the late 18th century: there was no other explanation for the 
considerable sum of money (24,000 lire!) lent to Francesco Brebbia and his 
sons Giuseppe and Luigi by Pietro and Alessandro Verri on 27 March 1783. 
The loan – which was to be paid back at 5% interest over three years – was 
so substantial that it required a special dispensation from the Senate, as 
the Count had guaranteed repayment with the income earned on a trust 
(Pietro was not concerned, however, as he considered Francesco «a 
temperate, punctual and honorable man»63). A few years later, Francesco 
would have his wife register «596 poles and 13 planks estimated to be worth 
2293.5.3. scudi» in his name, so that he could then transfer them to Count 
Andrea Passalacqua Lucini on 14 August 179264: it is very likely that this was 
yet another debt to be settled. In the autumn of 1827, his inept first-born son 
was only able to reimburse a very small portion of what he had so inexpertly 
embezzled; Giuseppe was already in prison by the spring of 1829, when the 
family’s financial status had become so precarious that his relatives were no 
longer able to come to his aid, and he was forced to ask the court for 
financial support during his incarceration (as per § 313)65. 
Yet not all of the blame lay with Giuseppe. Indeed, the wealthy, 
notable and liberal province of Brescia certainly needed more than a 
tarnished coat of arms at the helm of its government in order to feel 
represented. While it was true that Giuseppe had given in «to a sort of 
hereditary disease in his family by spending beyond his means»66, things 
____________________ 
63
 Letter of March 15, 1783, cited in G. di Renzo Villata, Verri contro Verri. «Una famiglia 
sbranata pel delirio di pochi anni» (1782-post 1709), in Edizione nazionale delle opere di 
Pietro Verri, vol. V, Scritti di argomento familiare e autobiografico, (ed. G. Barbarisi), Roma 
2003, pp. 727-728). For a good description of Senato dispensations, see A. Monti, Iudicare 
tamquam Deus. I modi della giustizia senatoria nel Ducato di Milano tra Cinque e 
Settecento, Milano 2003, pp. 184-216. 
64
 ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 125, n. 1184/geheim. 
65
 In addition to an imprisonment treatment ensuring only their survival, the criminal code 
allowed detainees «to dispose of their property» and even «to receive aid from other 
people», usually close relatives (see Codice Penale, first part, § 312). 
66
 Torresani to Hartig, n. 4141 PS, June 28, 1832, in ASMi, Presidenza di Governo, fold. 176, 
n. 641/geheim. 
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would have been better had the regime appointed someone who would 
have exalted the province’s pedigree and heritage; someone who would 
have made his mark on the way the province was run and have his own 
success come to be identified with the position itself. This was certainly not 
the case with the poor Count, whose family funds had already been in dire 
straits for some time. In short, though he had proved himself a fairly 
capable Beamte over his career, it had been an ill-advised decision to 
appoint Brebbia to Brescia: it had only damaged the efforts of a foreign 
government to be socially accepted by a demanding province with a 
strong, class-driven identity67. 
The center-periphery dialectic was an unavoidable variable to 
consider when building and managing an imperial system68, but it did not 
account for all the factors at play in what was still a ‘trial phase’ for the 
kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. One must only take a closer look at how the 
functions of local government were put in practice to get a clearer idea of 
what the role of provincial delegate entailed: while the position’s 
responsibilities made it an extremely delicate office to hold, it was 
tremendously appealing to those who wished to hold it.  
Delicate indeed. A telling memorial written around that time period 
revealed that «little is needed to be a counselor of the government», but 
that on the contrary, «the good government of a province requires greater 
intelligence, more skill, more knowledge of the world, a conviction that the 
public Spirit of the citizens towards the Sovereign must be preserved as is 
when favorable, and if it is not too favorable, that it may become so». The 
____________________ 
67
 Cfr. C. Mozzarelli, Sovrano, aristocrazia e amministrazione: un profilo costituzionale, in  
P. Schiera (ed.), La dinamica statale austriaca nel XVIII e XIX secolo, Bologna 1981, pp. 127-
159, particularly p. 147, and also A. Gottsmann, I rapporti politici e istituzionali tra il 
veneto e l’area centro-europea nell’Ottocento, in La storia e le tradizioni del Veneto. Le 
relazioni e la forma della comunicazione tra l’area veneta e il mondo germanico: Atti del 
convegno, Venezia 2003, p. 165. 
68
 Cfr. L. Mannori Introduzione, in L. Mannori (ed.), Comunità e poteri centrali negli antichi 
Stati italiani: Atti del Convegno «Comunità e poteri centrali negli antichi Stati italiani», 
Napoli 1997, pp. 38-42; Id., Modelli di governo territoriale nell’età della Restaurazione, in 
F. Micolo, G. Baggio, E. Fregoso (edd.), Diritto, cultura e riforme nell’età di Maria Luigia: 
Atti del Convegno – Parma, 14 e 15 dicembre 2007, Parma 2011, pp. 242-243. 
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key to success, therefore, was staying in contact with the people, in order 
to examine things from up close. Thus, it had been a wise decision to call 
Brebbia back to the capital and assign him a role in Government, where 
high-ranking officials had nothing to deal with except «the things on [their] 
desk». All the more so considering that he was in such «bad shape» 
physically that he had actually been impeded in his work69.  
On the other hand, it would not be fair to accuse these provincial 
officials of being unjustifiably ambitious. After all, the law itself provided 
for it, as demonstrated by some of the broadly-defined tasks that were 
assigned to the provinzial Delegiert in the Istruzioni published on 26 May 
1817: «inform and consult» the government; «oversee […] all things related 
to the public administration»; «take definitive measures […] for public 
order»; what’s more, this same legislation allowed delegates to expand 
these powers at their discretion during emergencies (§15)70. A counselor of 
the government had far less authority, as the organic laws of 1815 
commanded his strict subordination to the «aulic ministers whose orders 
he must carry out» (§ 4)71. 
____________________ 
69
 Pro Memoria per VE il Signor Conte Presidente di Strassoldo, August 29, 1825, in ASMi, 
Presidenza di Governo, fold. 57, n. 1104/geheim. This was confidential information taken 
from a report on higher officials in Lombardy, drafted by Giulio Strassoldo on July 24, 1825 
(in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Verträulichen Akten, fold. 56-10, file CCXVIII, pp. 38-66, 
particularly pp. 38-44). 
70
 Istruzioni per le imperiali regie delegazioni del regno lombardo-veneto approvate da 
S.M. con risoluzione sovrana data a Klausenburg il 26 agosto 1817, in Atti del Governo, 
1818, vol. I, second part, n. 16, §§ 3-4, 14 and 16, pp. 62-92. Cfr., on the theme, N. Raponi, 
Politica e amministrazione in Lombardia agli esordi dell’unità. Il programma dei moderati, 
Milano 1967, p. 31; B. Mazhol-Wallnig, Ordinamento centrale e amministrazioni locali: 
burocrazia austriaca nella tensione tra interessi statali e interessi locali. La provincia di 
Verona 1848-1859, in I problemi dell’amministrazione austriaca nel Lombardo-Veneto: Atti 
del Convegno di Conegliano organizzato in collaborazione con l’Associazione Italia-Austria 
20-23 settembre 1979, p. 30; Gottsmann, I rapporti politici e istituzionali [note 67], pp. 
161-182; Rossi, Il cattivo funzionario [note 14], pp. 29-30; L. Rossetto, Il commissario 
distrettuale nel Veneto asburgico. Un funzionario dell’Impero tra mediazione politica e 
controllo sociale (1819-1848), Bologna 2013, p. 208. 
71
 Regolamento per il Governo ed il Senato politico, cap. II, §§ 3-11, found in A. Sandonà, Il 
Regno lombardo veneto. La costituzione e l’amministrazione. Studi di storia del diritto: con 
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Of course, a delegate was expected to be willing to travel, as duly 
confirmed by the regulatory framework in place. There was indeed 
historical precedent: the protocol under Joseph II had provided for the 
heads of departments to make periodic visits to their offices, a practice 
that could even be partially traced back to the Spanish reign72. A circular 
letter sent out on 17 December 1817 recalled as much, ordering provincial 
officials to personally inspect their areas of jurisdiction at least once a year, 
not necessarily in one fell swoop but «even in various phases […] in order 
to enlighten the government as to the wishes and needs of the citizenry, 
and as to the conduct of its local administrations»73. 
In short, this was one of the few opportunities left for those in the 
noble ranks to show what they were made of in terms of running an 
administration: the imperial system was not yet fully operational, and 
there was still some control to be had at this intermediate level in the 
____________________ 
la scorta degli atti ufficiali dei Dicasteri centrali di Vienna, Milano 1912, pp. 105-110, and 
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detailed account of visits between the 16th and 17th centuries within Italian territories, 
see A. Dani, Le visite negli Stati italiani di Antico regime,  in Le Carte e la Storia, 18.1 
(2012), pp. 43-62. 
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 Atti del Governo, 1817, vol. II, second part, n. 186, pp. 454-455, also cited in A. 
Lorenzoni, Instituzioni del diritto pubblico interno per il Regno Lombardo-Veneto, vol. I, 
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Italienische Provinzen 74 . Although the new political climate was not 
particularly hostile to the Adelsstand, the latter had lost much of its past 
glories: from the period under French rule to the return of the Austrians, 
‘bureaucratic reform’ had cut all ties to the venality and inheritance of 
office. Any members of the nobility who wished to undertake a public 
career would now have to be properly inserted into the government 
hierarchy: they were to be subjected to an oath of office and all the 
symbolism that that entailed; they were to respect the rules of public office 
if they wished to remain in that role; and they were to comply with any 
procedures put into place to remove them from office in the event of 
serious offenses. Put briefly, they were to be treated on the same terms as 
any other official: the conclusion of the so-called ‘dethronement of the 
noble ranks’75.  
While the Napoleonic élite were being deprived of their rank in those 
early years of Lombardy-Venetia, the bourgeoisie had not yet formed. 
Consequently, the Lombard aristocracy was able to assert itself in the 
management of local affairs, if nothing else because there were quite a few 
positions to be covered, in addition to the fact they put up less resistance 
to the changes taking place. It is no secret that the initial appointments of 
high officials to the provincial government had one thing in common, 
____________________ 
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1997; L. Rossi, I ceti nobiliari europei nell’800, Napoli 1998, especially pp. 72-75 and 147-
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Eighteen Century, in Austrian History Yearbook, 37 (2006), pp. 35-57; A.G. Manca-F. Rugge 
(edd.), Governo rappresentativo e dirigenze amministrative (secoli XIX-XX)/Repräsentative 
Regierung und führende Beamte (19.-20 Jarhundert), Bologna-Berlin 2007; M. Meriggi, Gli 
stati italiani prima dell’Unità, Bologna 2011
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«which evens out the apparent lack of homogeneity: namely, membership 
of the nobility»76. From this point of view, Giuseppe Brebbia’s curriculum 
was very similar to that of the other provincial delegates at the time, as 
were his origins. It would not be until the decades to follow – and the 
change would become increasingly apparent from the late 1830s to 1848 – 
that a more clear-cut ‘professional calling’ emerged, thus marking a new 
way of becoming part of the establishment77. 
Even though social class and administrative institutions were 
inextricably tied, it is certainly not difficult to see that therein lay a 
fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, the central government was 
relying on a ‘traditional’ aristocracy that represented the society’s élite, «a 
landed nobility that, on a provincial level, counted the most important and 
influential people among its ranks»78; on the other hand, the Habsburg 
regime aspired to a modern sense of impersonal, or better still, classless 
administration. Therein lay the empire’s weakness in mediating between 
the political and social spheres during this stage of their rule; that is, before 
the cards would be reshuffled in the bourgeoisie’s favor.  
And just when the time was ripe to take stock of what was, for the 
most part, the positive work that had been carried out by the aristocrats in 
the department, Count Giuseppe Brebbia of Milan risked stoking tensions 
and throwing everything out of balance with his misconduct, which very 
well might have be the spark that set off the powder keg. No wonder, then, 
that the upper echelons took immediate action to contain the damage; 
that they carefully performed a thorough investigation; and that they 
discreetly and promptly took all the necessary steps to eventually remove 
him from office and deliver a sentence in the utmost secrecy. 
Of course, whether they were counselors or magistrates, the fact that 
the high officials of Lombardy had to bring one of their own to trial clearly 
put them in a difficult position, and no less so when it came time to 
____________________ 
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 Meriggi, Amministrazioni e classi sociali [note 74], p. 102. 
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 On this matter see C. Mozzarelli, Il modello del pubblico impiegato nel Lombardo-Veneto 
della Restaurazione, in F. Valsecchi-A. Wandruzka (edd.), Austria e province italiane 1815-
1918. Potere centrale e amministrazioni locali, Bologna 1981, pp. 279-300; W. Heindl, 
Gehorsame Rebellen. Bürokratie un Beamte in Österreich 1780 bis 1848, Wien 1991. 
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permanently dismiss him from his post. In sum, can it be said the scandal 
surrounding the Fondo di primitiva istruzione was actually the first step 
towards a change in how one gained access to local government? That 
finally, it was no longer social prestige that opened the doors to the high 
ranks, but rather the high ranks that opened the doors to social prestige? 
Not yet. Rather, I would say that the problem was still being ‘digested’ 
towards the end of the 1820s, and while there was growing awareness that 
the traditional order was flawed, there were still no signs of making any 
radical adjustments. Witness Brebbia’s replacement to the Brescia 
delegation, Gaudenzio De Pagave: a man of similar ‘caliber’, he was a 
capable official who belonged to the gentry, and indeed his social class had 
had a decades-long history of members in public office79. 
____________________ 
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